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Abstract. We study competitive resource allocation problems in which
players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject
to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to
pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a nondecreasing and con-
vex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model
of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with
integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-
specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource
allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by
giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilib-
rium.
1 Introduction
In an influential paper, Rosenthal [23] introduced congestion games, a class of
strategic games, where a finite set of players competes over a finite set of re-
sources. Each player is associated with a set of allowable subsets of resources
and a pure strategy of a player consists of an allowable subset. In the context of
network games, the resources may correspond to edges of a graph and the allow-
able subsets correspond to the paths connecting a source and a sink. The utility
of a resource depends only on the number of players choosing the same resource
and each player wants to maximize (minimize) the utility (cost) of the sum of the
resources contained in the selected subset. Rosenthal proved the existence of a
pure Nash equilibrium. Up to day congestion games have been used as reference
models for describing decentralized systems involving the selfish allocation of
congestible resources (e.g., selfish route choices in traffic networks [4,25,29] and
flow control in telecommunication networks [17,18,27]) and for decades they have
been a focal point of research in (algorithmic) game theory, operations research
and theoretical computer science.
In the past, the existence of pure Nash equilibria has been analyzed in
many variants of congestion games such as singleton congestion games with
player-specific cost functions (cf. [11,16,21,22]), congestion games with weighted
players (cf. [1,2,5,10,13]), nonatomic and atomic splittable congestion games
(cf. [4,14,18,29]) and congestion games with player- and resource-specific and
variable demands (cf. [12]).
Most of these previous works can be classified according to the following two
categories: (i) the demand of each player is unsplittable and must be completely
assigned to exactly one subset of the allowable subsets; (ii) the demand of a
player may be fractionally split over the set of allowable subsets. While these
assumptions and the resulting models are obviously important (and also realistic
for some applications), they do not allow for the requirement that only integral
fractions of the demand may be assigned to allowable subsets of resources. This
requirement is clearly important in many applications, where the demand repre-
sents a collection of indivisible items or tasks that need to be placed on subsets
of resources. Examples include the scheduling of integer-splittable tasks in the
context of load balancing on server farms (cf. [19]) or in logistics where a player
controls a fleet of vehicles and each must be assigned to a single route.
Although Rosenthal proposed congestion games with integer-splittable de-
mands as an important and meaningful model already back in 1973 – in his
first work on congestion games [24] even published prior to his more famous
work [23] – not much is known regarding existence and computability of pure
Nash equilibria. Rosenthal gave an example showing that in general, pure Nash
equilibria need not exist. Dunkel and Schulz [7] strengthened this result showing
that the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in integer-splittable congestion
games is NP-complete to decide. Meyers [20] proved that in games with linear
cost functions, a pure Nash equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist. For sin-
gleton strategy spaces and nonnegative and convex cost functions, Tran-Thanh
et al. [28] showed the existence of pure Nash equilibria. They also showed that
pure Nash equilibria need not exist (even for the restricted strategy spaces) if
cost functions are semi-convex.
Our Results. We introduce congestion games on integral polymatroids, where
each player may fractionally assign the demand in integral units among the
allowable subsets of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity
constraints. This way, the resulting strategy space for each player forms an inte-
gral polymatroid base polyhedron (truncated at the player-specific demand). As
our main result, we devise an algorithm that computes a pure Nash equilibrium
for congestion games on integral polymatroids with player-specific nonnegative,
nondecreasing and strongly semi-convex cost functions. The class of strongly
semi-convex functions strictly includes convex functions but is included in the
class of semi-convex functions (see Section 2 for a formal definition). The run-
time of our algorithm is bounded by nδ+1 · mδδδ+1, where n is the number of
players, m the number of resources, and δ is an upper bound on the maximum
demand. Thus, for constant δ, the algorithm is polynomial.
Our existence result generalizes that of Tran-Thanh et al. [28] for singleton
congestion games with integer-splittable demands and convex cost functions and
that of Ackermann et al. [1] for matroid congestion games with unit demands and
player-specific nondecreasing costs. For the important class of network design
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games, where players need to allocate bandwidth in integral units across multiple
spanning trees of a player-specific communication graph (cf. [3,6,9]), our result
shows for the first time the existence of pure Nash equilibria provided that the
cost on each edge is a strongly semi-convex function of total bandwidth allocated.
Techniques. Our algorithm for computing pure Nash equilibria maintains data
structures for preliminary demands, strategy spaces, and strategies of the players
that all are set to zero initially. Then, it iteratively increases the demand of a
player by one unit and recomputes a preliminary pure Nash equilibrium (with
respect to the current demands) by following a sequence of best response moves
of players. The key insight to prove the correctness of the algorithm is based
on two invariants that are fulfilled during the course of the algorithm. As first
invariant we can without loss of generality assume that, whenever the demand
of a player is increased by one unit, there is a best response that assigns the new
unit to some resource without changing the allocation of previously assigned
demand units. As second invariant, we obtain that, after assigning this new unit
to some resource, only those players that use the resource with increased load
may have an incentive to deviate. Moreover, there is a best response that has
the property that at most a single unit is shifted to some other resource. Given
the above two invariants, we prove that during the sequence of best response
moves a carefully defined vector of marginal costs lexicographically decreases,
thus, ensuring that the sequence is finite.
The first invariant follows by reducing an integral polymatroid to an ordinary
matroid (cf. Helgason [15]) and the fact that for a matroid, a minimum inde-
pendent set Id with rank d can be extended to a minimum independent set Id+1
with rank d+1 by adding a single element to Id. The second invariant, however,
is significantly more complex since a change of the load of one resource results
(when using the matroid construction in the spirit of Helgason) in changed ele-
ment weights of several elements simultaneously. To prove the second invariant
we use several exchange and uncrossing arguments that make use of the submod-
ularity of the rank functions and the fact that a non-optimal basis of a matroid
can be improved locally. This is the technically most involved part of our paper.
We note that the above invariants have also been used by Tran-Thanh et
al. [28] for showing the existence of pure Nash equilibria in singleton integer-
splittable congestion games. For singleton games, however, these invariants follow
almost directly. The algorithmic idea to incrementally increase the total demand
by one unit is similar to the (inductive) existence proof of Milchtaich [21] for
singleton congestion games with player-specific cost functions (see also Ackerman
et al. [1] for a similar proof for matroid congestion games). The convergence proof
for our algorithm and the above mentioned invariants, however, are considerably
more involved for general integral polymatroids.
Besides providing new existence results for an important and large class of
games, the main contribution of this paper is to propose a unified approach to
prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria that connects the seemingly unrelated
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existence results of Milchtaich [21] and Ackerman et al. [1] on the one hand, and
Tran-Thanh et al. [28] on the other hand.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce polymatroids, strong semi-convexity, and congestion
games on integral polymatroids.
Polymatroids. Let N denote the set of nonnegative integers and let R be a
finite and non-empty set of resources. We write NR shorthand for N|R|. Through-
out this paper, vectors x = (xr)r∈R will be denoted with bold face. An integral
(set) function f : 2R → N is submodular if f(U) + f(V ) ≥ f(U ∪ V ) + f(U ∩ V )
for all U, V ∈ 2R. Function f is monotone if U ⊆ V implies f(U) ≤ f(V ), and
normalized if f(∅) = 0. An integral submodular, monotone and normalized func-
tion f : 2R → N is called an integral polymatroid rank function. The associated
integral polyhedron is defined as
Pf :=
{
x ∈ NR :
∑
r∈U
xr ≤ f(U) for each U ⊆ R
}
.
Given the integral polyhedron Pf and some integer d ∈ N with d ≤ f(R), the
d-truncated integral polymatroid Pf (d) is defined as
Pf (d) :=
{
x ∈ NR :
∑
r∈U
xr ≤ f(U) for each U ⊆ R,
∑
r∈R
xr ≤ d
}
.
The corresponding integral polymatroid base polyhedron is
Bf (d) :=
{
x ∈ NR :
∑
r∈U
xr ≤ f(U) for each U ⊆ R,
∑
r∈R
xr = d
}
.
Strongly Semi-Convex Functions. Recall that a function c : N → N is
convex if c(x+1)− c(x) ≤ c(x+2)− c(x+1) for all x ∈ N. A function c is called
semi-convex if the function x · c(x) is convex, i.e.,
(x+ 1)c(x+ 1)− xc(x) ≤ (x+ 2)c(x+ 2)− (x + 1)c(x+ 1)
for all x ∈ N.
For the main existence result of this paper, we require a property of each
cost function that we call strong semi-convexity, which is weaker than convexity
but stronger than semi-convexity. Roughly speaking, it states that the marginal
difference c(a + x)x − c(a + x − 1)(x − 1) does not decrease as a or x increase.
We also introduce a slightly weaker notion, termed u-truncated strong semi-
convexity, where strong semi-convexity is only required for values of x not larger
than u.
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Definition 1 (Strong Semi-Convexity). A function c : N → N is strongly
semi-convex if
c(a+ x)x − c(a+ x− 1)(x− 1) ≤ c(b+ y)y − c(b+ y − 1)(y − 1) (1)
for all x, y ∈ N with 1 ≤ x ≤ y and all a, b ∈ N with a ≤ b. For an integer u ≥ 1,
c is u-truncated strongly semi-convex, if the above inequality is only required to
be satisfied for all x, y ∈ N with 1 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ u and all a, b ∈ N with a ≤ b.
We note that a similar definition is also given in Tran-Thanh et al. [28]. We pro-
ceed to prove that strong semi-convexity is indeed strictly weaker than convexity.
The proof is moved to the appendix.
Proposition 1. Every convex and nondecreasing function c : N → N is also
strongly semi-convex, but not vice versa.
Remark 1. A function is 1-truncated strongly semi-convex if and only if it is
nondecreasing.
Congestion Games on Integral Polymatroids. In a congestion game on
integral polymatroids, there is a non-empty and finite set N of players and a
non-empty and finite set R of resources each endowed with a player-specific
cost function ci,r : N → N, r ∈ R, i ∈ N . Each player i is associated with a
demand di ∈ N, di ≥ 1 and an integral polymatroid rank function f (i) : 2R →
N that together define a di-truncated integral polymatroid Pf(i)(di) with base
polyhedron Bf(i)(di) on the set of resources. A strategy of player i ∈ N is to
choose a vector xi = (xi,r)r∈R ∈ Bf(i)(di), i.e., player i chooses an integral
resource consumption xi,r ∈ N for each resource r such that the demand di is
exactly distributed among the resources and for each U ⊆ R not more than
f (i)(U) units of demand are distributed to the resources contained in U . Using
the notation xi = (xi,r)r∈R, the set Xi of feasible strategies of player i is defined
as
Xi = Bf(i)(di) =
{
xi ∈ N
R :
∑
r∈U
xi,r ≤ f
(i)(U) for each U ⊆ R,
∑
r∈R
xi,r = di
}
.
The Cartesian product X =×i∈N Xi of the players’ sets of feasible strategies
is the joint strategy space. An element x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X is a strategy profile.
For a resource r, and a strategy profile x ∈ X , we write xr =
∑
i∈N xi,r . The
private cost of player i under strategy profile x ∈ X is defined as pii(x) =∑
r∈R ci,r(xr)xi,r. In the remainder of the paper, we will compactly represent
the strategic game by the tuple G = (N,X, (di)i∈N , (ci,r)i∈N,r∈R).
We use standard game theory notation. For a player i ∈ N and a strategy
profile x ∈ X , we write x as (xi,x−i). A best response of player i to x−i is a
strategy xi ∈ Xi with pii(xi,x−i) ≤ pii(yi,x−i) for all yi ∈ Xi. A pure Nash
equilibrium is a strategy profile x ∈ X such that for each player i the strategy
xi is a best response to x−i.
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Throughout this paper, we assume that the player-specific cost functions
of player i on resource r are ui,r-truncated strongly semi-convex, where ui,r =
f (i)({r}). Note that ui,r is a natural upper bound on the units of demand player i
can allocate to resource r in any strategy xi ∈ Xi.
Assumption. For all i ∈ N, r ∈ R, the cost function ci,r : N→ N is nonnegative,
nondecreasing and ui,r-truncated strongly semi-convex, where ui,r = f
(i)({r}).
2.1 Examples
We proceed to illustrate that we obtain the well known classes of integer-splittable
singleton congestion games and matroid congestion games as special cases of con-
gestion games on integer polymatroids.
Example 1 (Singleton integer-splittable congestion games). For the special case
that for each player i, there is a player-specific subset Ri ⊆ R of resources
such that f (i)({r}) = di, if r ∈ Ri, and f (i)({r}) = 0, otherwise, we obtain
integer-splittable singleton congestion games previously studied by Tran-Thanh
et al. [28]. While they consider the special case of convex and player-independent
cost functions, our general existence result implies existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium even for player-specific and strongly semi-convex cost functions.
Example 2 (Matroid congestion games with player-specific costs). For the special
case, that for each player i, f (i) is the rank function of a player-specific matroid
defined on R, and di = f
(i)(R), we obtain ordinary matroid congestion games
with player-specific costs and unit demands studied by Ackermann et al. [1] as
a special case.
Note that the rank function rk of a matroid is always subcardinal, i.e.,
rk(U) ≤ |U | for all U ⊆ R. Thus, we obtain in particular that rk({r}) ≤ 1
for all r ∈ R. This implies that our existence result continues to hold if we only
require that the player-specific cost functions are 1-truncated strongly semi-
convex, which is equivalent to requiring that cost functions are nondecreasing
as in [1]. Like this, we obtain the existence result of [1] as a special case of our
existence result for congestion games on integer polymatroids. As a strict gen-
eralization, our model includes the case in which players have a demand di ∈ N
that can be distributed in integer units over bases (or even arbitrary indepen-
dent sets) of a given player-specific matroid. A prominent application arises in
network design (cf. [3,6,9]), where a player needs to allocate bandwidth along
several spanning trees and the cost function for installing enough capacity on an
edge is a convex function of the total bandwidth allocated.
3 Equilibrium Existence
In this section, we give an algorithm that computes a pure Nash equilibrium
for congestion games on integral polymatroids. Our algorithm relies on two key
sensitivity properties of optimal solutions minimizing a linear function over an
6
integral polymatroid base polyhedron (see Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below). After
reducing the usual reduction of integer polymatroids to ordinary matroids (cf.
[15]), Lemma 1 follows more or less directly from the respective property for
matroids. The proof of Lemma 2 is considerably more involved and relies heavily
on uncrossing arguments. The two lemmata will be proven formally in Section 4.
Key Sensitivity Results. For two vectors xi,yi ∈ NR, we denote their Ham-
ming distance by H(xi,yi) :=
∑
r∈R |xi,r− yi,r|. Lemma 1 shows that whenever
xi minimizes the cost of player i over the base polyhedron Bf(i)(di), then we
only need to increase xi,r for some r ∈ R by one unit to obtain a yi minimizing
the player’s cost over the base polyhedron Bf(i)(di + 1).
Lemma 1 (Demand Increase). Let xi ∈ Bf(i)(di) be a best response of player i
to x−i ∈ X−i. Then there exists a best response yi ∈ Bf(i)(di + 1) to x−i such
that H(xi,yi) = 1.
The second result shows that if some other player j 6= i increases the j-load on
some resource r that is also used by player i with at least one unit, then player i
can simply shift one unit from r to some s ∈ R in order to retain minimal costs.
Lemma 2 (Load Increase). Let xi ∈ Bf(i)(di) be a best response of player i to
x−i ∈ X−i and for each resource r let ar =
∑
j 6=i xj,r be the induced allocation.
If for a resource r, the value ar is increase by 1, then there exists a best response
yi ∈ Bf(i)(di) towards the new profile with H(xi,yi) ∈ {0, 2}.
The Algorithm. Both sensitivity results are used as the main building blocks
for Algorithm 1 that computes a pure Nash equilibrium for congestion games
on integral polymatroids. Algorithm 1 maintains preliminary demands, strategy
spaces, and strategies of the players denoted by d¯i ≤ di, X¯i = Xi(d¯i), and
xi ∈ X¯i, respectively. Initially, d¯i is set to zero for all i ∈ N and the strategy
profile, where the strategy of each player equals the zero vector is a pure Nash
equilibrium for this game in which the demand of each player is zero.
Then, in each round, for some player i the demand is increased from d¯i to
d¯i + 1, and a best response yi ∈ X(d¯i + 1) with H(xi,yi) = 1 is computed, see
Line 5 in Algorithm 1. By Lemma 1, such a best response always exists. In effect,
the load on exactly one resource r increases and only those players j with xj,r > 0
on this resource can potentially decrease their private cost by a deviation. By
Lemma 2, a best response of such players consists w.l.o.g. of moving a single unit
from this resource to another resource, see Line 8 of Algorithm 1. As a conse-
quence, during the while-loop (Lines 7-10), only one additional unit (compared
to the previous iteration) is moved preserving the invariant that only players
using a resource to which this additional unit is assigned may have an incentive
to profitably deviate. Thus, if the while-loop is left, the current strategy profile x
is a pure Nash equilibrium for the reduced game G¯ = (N, X¯, d¯, (ci,r)i∈N,r∈R).
Now we are ready to prove the main existence result.
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ALGORITHM 1: Compute PNE
Input: G = (N,X, (di)i∈N , (ci,r)i∈N,r∈R)
Output: pure Nash equilibrium x
1 d¯i ← 0, X¯i ← Xi(0) and xi ← 0 for all i ∈ N ;
2 for k = 1, . . . ,
∑
i∈N
di do
3 Choose i ∈ N with d¯i < di;
4 d¯i ← d¯i + 1; X¯i ← Xi(d¯i);
5 Choose a best response yi ∈ X¯i with H(yi, xi) = 1;
6 xi ← yi;
7 while ∃i ∈ N who can improve in G¯ = (N, X¯, d¯, (ci,r)i∈N,r∈R) do
8 Compute a best response yi ∈ X¯i with H(yi,xi) = 2;
9 xi ← yi;
10 end
11 end
12 Return x;
Theorem 1. Congestion games on integral polymatroids with player-specific
nonnegative, nondecreasing, and strongly semi-convex cost functions possess a
pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We prove by induction on the total demand d =
∑
i∈N di of the input
game G = (N,X, (di)i∈N , (ci,r)i∈N,r∈R) that Algorithm 1 computes a pure Nash
equilibrium of G.
For d = 0, this is trivial. Suppose that the algorithm works correctly for
games with total demand d−1 for some d ≥ 1 and consider a game G with total
demand d. Let us assume that in Line 3, the algorithm always chooses a player
with minimum index. Consider the game G′ = (N,X, (d′i)i∈N , (ci,r)i∈N,r∈R) that
differs from G only in the fact that the demand of the last player n is reduced
by one, i.e. d′i = di for all i < n and d
′
n = dn − 1. Then, when running the
algorithm with G′ as input, the d− 1 iterations (of the for-loop) are equal to the
first d − 1 iterations when running the algorithm with G as input. Thus, with
G as input, we may assume that after the first d− 1 iterations, the preliminary
strategy profile that we denote by x′ is a pure Nash equilibrium of G′.
We analyze the final iteration k = d of the algorithm in which the demand
of player n is increased by 1 (see Line 4). In Line 5, a best reply yn with
H(xn,yn) = 1 is computed which exists by Lemma 1. Then, as long as there
is a player i that can improve unilaterally, in Line 8, a best response yi with
H(yi,xi) = 2 is computed which exists by Lemma 2.
It remains to show that the while-loop in Lines 7–10 terminates. To prove
this, we give each unit of demand of each player i ∈ N an identity denoted by
ij , j = 1, . . . , di. For a strategy profile x, we define r(ij ,x) ∈ R to be the resource
to which unit ij is assigned in strategy profile x. Let x
l be the strategy profile
after Line 8 of the algorithm has been executed the l-th time, where we use the
convention that x0 denotes the preliminary strategy profile when entering the
while-loop. As we chose in Line 5 a strategy of player n with Hamming distance
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one, there is a unique resource r0 such that x
0
r0
= x′r0 + 1 and x
0
r = x
′
r for all
r ∈ R \ {r0}. Furthermore, because we choose in Line 8 a best response with
Hamming distance two, a simple inductive claim shows that after each iteration l
of the while-loop, there is a unique resource rl ∈ R such that xlrl = x
′
rl
+ 1 and
xlr = x
′
r for all r ∈ R \ {rl}.
For any xl during the course of the algorithm, we define the marginal cost of
unit ij under strategy profile x
l as
∆ij (x
l) =
{
ci,r(x
l
r)x
l
i,r − ci,r(x
l
r − 1) (x
l
i,r − 1), if r = r(ij ,x) = rl
ci,r(x
l
r + 1)x
l
i,r − ci,r(x
l
r) (x
l
i,r − 1), if r = r(ij ,x) 6= rl.
(2)
Intuitively, if r(ij ,x) = rl, the value ∆ij (x) measures the cost saving on resource
r(ij ,x) if ij (or any other unit of player i on resource r(ij ,x)) is removed from
r(ij ,x). If r(ij ,x) 6= rl, the value ∆ij (x) measures the cost saving if ij is removed
from r(ij ,x) after the total allocation has been increased by one unit by some
other player. For a strategy profile x we define ∆(x) = (∆ij (x))i=1,...,n,j=1,...,di
to be the vector of marginal costs and let ∆¯(x) be the vector of marginal costs
sorted in non-increasing order. We claim that ∆¯(x) decreases lexicographically
during the while-loop. To see this, consider an iteration l in which some unit ij
of player i is moved from resource rl−1 to resource rl.
For proving ∆¯(xl) <lex ∆¯(x
l−1), we first observe that we only have to care
for ∆-values that correspond to units ij of the deviating player i, because for
all players h 6= i we obtain ∆hj (x
l−1) = ∆hj (x
l) for all j = 1, . . . , dh. This
follows immediately if hj is neither assigned to rl−1 nor to rl. If hj is assigned
to rl−1 or rl, then we switch the case in (2), and the claimed equality still holds.
It remains to consider the ∆-values corresponding to the units of the deviating
player i. Recall that the deviation of player i consists of moving unit ij from
resource rl−1 to resource rl. We obtain
∆ij (x
l−1) = ci,rl−1(x
l
rl−1
)xli,rl−1 − ci,rl−1(x
l
rl−1
− 1) (xli,rl−1 − 1)
> ci,rl(x
l
rl
+ 1) (xli,rl + 1)− ci,rl(x
l
rl
)xli,rl = ∆ij (x
l),
where the inequality follows since player i strictly improves. For every unit im
of player i that is assigned to resource rl as well, i.e, r(im,x
l) = r(ij ,x
l) = rl,
we have ∆ij (x
l) = ∆im(x
l) since the ∆-value is the same for all units of a single
player assigned to the same resource. The ∆-values of such units im might have
increased, but only to the ∆-value of unit ij.
Next, consider the ∆-values of a unit im assigned to resource rl−1, i.e.,
r(im,x
l) = r(ij ,x
l) = rl−1. We obtain
∆im(x
l) = ci,rl(x
l
rl−1
) (xli,rl−1 − 1)− ci,rl−1(x
l
rl−1
− 1) (xli,rl−1 − 2)
≤ ci,rl−1(x
l
rl−1
)xli,rl−1 − ci,rl−1(x
l
rl−1
− 1) (xli,rl−1 − 1) = ∆im(x
l−1),
where for the inequality we used that ci,r(xrl−1) ≥ ci,r(xrl−1 − 1) as ci,r is
nondecreasing.
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Altogether, the ∆-values of all units of all players h 6= i have not changed,
for player i, the ∆-values of remaining units assigned to resource rl−1 decreased,
and the ∆-values assigned to resource rl increased exactly to ∆ij (x
l) which is
strictly smaller than ∆ij (x
l−1). Thus, ∆¯(xl) <lex ∆¯(x
l−1) follows. ⊓⊔
The following corollary states an upper bound on the number of iterations of the
algorithm in terms of δ = maxi∈N di. The proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Corollary 1. The number of iterations is at most nδ+1mδδδ+1, which yields a
polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium for constant δ.
4 Sensitivity Analysis for Integral Polymatroids
It remains to show the key sensitivity results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. For
ease of notation, let us drop the index i form the statements of the lemmata and
let us consider a fixed integral polymatroid base polyhedron
Bf(d) =
{
x ∈ NR :
∑
r∈U
xr ≤ f(U) for each U ⊆ R,
∑
r∈R
xr = d
}
.
w.r.t. some submodular, monotone, and normalized function f : 2R → N, and
some demand value d ∈ N .
We identify the points in Bf(d) with a set family F(d) on a largely extended
ground set E as follows: For each resource r ∈ R, let ur = f({r}) and let
Kr = {r1 ≺ . . . ≺ rur} be a totally ordered set (chain) with |ur| distinct elements
r1, . . . , rur . Let further E =
⋃
r∈RKr be the disjoint union of these chains.
Then, P = (E,) is a partially ordered set (poset) where two elements e, e′
are comparable if and only if they are contained in the same chain Kr for some
r ∈ R. Furthermore, let D(P ) denote the set of ideals of P , i.e., D(P ) consists
of all subsets I ⊆ E such that for each e ∈ I all elements g ≺ e also belong
to I. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets in D(P )
and the integral points in {x ∈ NR : xr ≤ f({r}) ∀r ∈ R}. As a consequence,
the feasible points in the integral polymatroid Pf can be identified with the set
family
F :=
{
F ∈ D(P ) :
∣∣∣⋃
r∈U
Kr ∩ F
∣∣∣ ≤ f(U) for each U ⊆ R}. (3)
Accordingly, the vectors contained in the polymatroid base polyhedron Bf(d)
for d ∈ N can be identified with the set family
F(d) :=
{
F ∈ F : |F | = d
}
. (4)
In fact, it is known (see, e.g., [26] and [15]) that any integral polymatroid Pf
can be reduced to an ordinary matroid M = (E, r) on ground set E with rank
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function r : 2E → N defined via
r(U) := min
T⊆R
(∣∣∣U \ ⋃
r∈T
Kr
∣∣∣+ f(T ))
for all U ⊆ E. It turns out that the independent sets in M of cardinality d are
exactly the ideals in F(d) as defined above. Applying this kind of transformation
for each player i, we can identify the strategy set Bf(i)(di) of each player i with
the set family Fi(di), and this set family, in turn, with the matroidMi = (Ei, ri).
With this notation, let us now return to the problem of finding a best re-
sponse xi of player i towards a strategy profile a = x−i ∈ NR of the remaining
players. Note that, for a ∈ NR, the player-specific strongly semi-convex cost
functions ci,r : N→ N induce weight functions wai : E → N on the ground set E
constructed above via
wai (rt) := tci,r(ar + t)− (t− 1)ci,r(ar + t− 1) for all r ∈ R, t ∈ {1, . . . , di}.
Hence, finding a best response xi ∈ Bf(i)(di) reduces to the problem of minimiz-
ing a linear function over the independent sets of cardinality di of the matroid
Mi = (Ei, ri) associated with the submodular function f (i).
However, the ground set Ei can be of exponential size, so that it is not a priori
clear whether the matroid greedy algorithm minimizes a linear weight function
over the base polyhedron Bf(i)(di) in strongly polynomial time. Still, since we
assume that the cost functions ci,r : N→ N are strongly semi-convex, it follows
that the induced weight functions wai : E → N are admissible in the sense that
e ≺ g implies wi(e) ≤ wi(g).
Given an ideal F ∈ D(P ), we denote by F+ the set of -maximal elements in
F , and by (E \F )− the set of -minimal elements in E \F . For F(d) as defined
in (4), and any admissible weight functions w : E → N, Faigle [8] showed that
the following ordered greedy algorithm determines an ideal of minimal weight in
F(d) (provided F(d) 6= ∅):
ALGORITHM 2: Ordered Greedy Algorithm
1 F ← ∅;
2 for k = 1, . . . , d do
3 Let ek ← argmin{w(e) : e ∈ (E \ F )
− and F + e ∈ F};
4 F ← F + ek;
5 end
6 Return F ;
In fact, the greedy algorithm determines in each iteration k ≤ d an ideal of
minimal weight in F(k). The following proposition arises as a consequence of
the discussion above and implies Lemma 1.
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Proposition 2. Let F ⊆ D(P ) as defined in (3), k ∈ N, and w : E → R
admissible. Suppose F is of minimal w-weight in F(k). Then there exists e ∈
E \ F such that F + e is of minimal w-weight in F(k + 1)
Due to the reduction of integral polymatroids to ordinary matroids, most of
the structural properties of matroids carry over to integral polymatroids. For
example, the following proposition follows as a consequence of the well-known
fact, that for any basis B of an ordinary matroid M which is not of minimal
weight, there exists a local improvement step towards a basis B−e+f of smaller
weight.
Proposition 3. Suppose F ∈ F(k) is not of minimal w-weight for some ad-
missible function w : E → R. Then there exists some local improvement step
F → F − e + g ∈ F(k) such that w(e) > w(g).
The possibility to improve a non-optimal basis by local steps, as well as the
possibility to uncross tight constraints due to the submodularity of the rank
functions, are the main ingredients of the proof of the following theorem, which
implies Lemma 2.
Theorem 2. Let F ∈ F(k) be of minimal weight w.r.t. the admissible weight
function w. If the weight function w¯ differs from w only on chain Kr∗ such that
w¯(rk) =
{
w(rk), if r 6= r∗,
w(rk+1), else,
then there exists F ′ = F − e+ g ∈ F(k) of minimal weight w.r.t. w¯.
Proof. Let F be of minimal w-weight in F(k) and w¯ as described above. If F
is also of minimal w¯-weight, the theorem follows using e = g. If F is not w¯-
minimal, then by Proposition 3, there exists e ∈ F+ and g ∈ (E \ F )− with
w¯(e) > w¯(g) such that F − e + g ∈ F(k).We choose the pair {e, g} maximizing
the improvement w¯(e)− w¯(g). Since F is w-optimal, it follows that e ∈ Kr∗ and
g /∈ Kr∗ . We want to show that F
′ = F − e+ g is of minimal w¯-weight. Suppose
not. By Proposition 3, there exists F ′′ = F ′ − p + h ∈ F(k) with w¯(p) > w¯(h).
It follows that h /∈ Kr∗ . Lemmata A1 and A2 which are stated and proven in
Appendix A.3 imply g 6 h, and either F − p+ h ∈ F(k) or F − e+ h ∈ F(k).
We proceed to show the desired contradiction. First, we claim that F−p+h /∈
F(k). To see this, note that if F − p+ h ∈ F(k), then also w(p) ≤ w(h) by the
w-optimality of F . On the other hand, w¯(p) > w¯(h) = w(h), which implies
w¯(p) > w(p). This is only possible if p ∈ Kr∗ . However, since p ∈ F ′ and e 6∈ F ′,
it follows that p ≺ e. Thus F − p+ h is not an ideal in poset P , and we reach a
contradiction.
Hence, we have F−p+h /∈ F(k), but F−e+h ∈ F(k). Note that w¯(h) ≥ w¯(g),
as otherwise, w¯(F−e+h) < w¯(F−e+g) in contradiction to the choice of the pair
{e, g}. Moreover, since g, h /∈ Kr∗ , it follows that w(h) = w¯(h) ≥ w¯(g) = w(g).
We proceed to show that F − p + g /∈ F(k). Suppose not. Then, by w-
optimality of F , w(p) ≤ w(g). On the other hand, w¯(p) > w¯(h) = w(h), since
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w¯(F ′ − p+ h) < w¯(F ′). If p 6 e, then w(h) < w¯(p) = w(p) ≤ w(g), a contradic-
tion. Thus, p ≺ e implying that w¯(p) = w(e) > w¯(h) = w(h), in contradiction
to F − e+ h ∈ F(k).
Summarizing, we have F−p+g /∈ F(k), F−p+h /∈ F(k) and g 6 h. We show
that this is not possible. In case p ≺ e, we have w(e) = w¯(p) > w¯(h) = w(h). This
is in contradiction to the w-optimality of F , as we assumed that F−e+h ∈ F(k).
Hence p 6 e, implying that F − p+ h and F − p+ h are ideals in P .
Thus, as F −p+g /∈ F(k) and F −p+h /∈ F(k), there must be sets S, T ⊆ R
with |
⋃
r∈S Kr ∩ (F − p+ g)| > f(S) and |
⋃
r∈T Kr ∩ (F − p+h)| > f(T ). Since
F is feasible, it follows that
f(S) <
∣∣∣ ⋃
r∈S
Kr ∩ (F − p+ g)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ ⋃
r∈S
Kr ∩ F
∣∣∣+ 1 ≤ f(S) + 1,
f(T ) <
∣∣∣ ⋃
r∈T
Kr ∩ (F − p+ h)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ ⋃
r∈T
Kr ∩ F
∣∣∣ ≤ f(T ) + 1.
Thus, g ∈
⋃
r∈SKr, p /∈
⋃
r∈SKr, h ∈
⋃
r∈T Kr, and p /∈
⋃
r∈T Kr. Moreover,
by the integrality of f , |
⋃
r∈S Kr ∩ F | = f(S) and |
⋃
r∈T Kr ∩ F | = f(T ). By
the submodularity of f , it is not hard to see that also for S ∩ T and S ∪ T we
have ∣∣∣ ⋃
r∈S∩T
Kr ∩ F
∣∣∣ = f(S ∩ T ) and ∣∣∣ ⋃
r∈S∪T
Kr ∩ F
∣∣∣ = f(S ∪ T ). (5)
However, F − e + g − p+ h ∈ F(k) implies {e, g, p, h} ∩
⋃
r∈S∪T Kr = {g, e, h}.
Thus, using (5), we obtain |
⋃
r∈S∪T Kr ∩ (F − e+ g − p+ h)| = |
⋃
r∈S∪T Kr ∩
F |+ 1 = f(S ∪ T ) + 1, a contradiction to F − e+ g − p+ h ∈ F(k). ⊓⊔
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We start to show the first part of the claim. Let c : N → N be a nonde-
creasing convex function. As marginal differences are nondecreasing, we obtain
c(a+ x)− c(a+ x− 1) ≤ c(a+ y)− c(a+ y − 1) (6)
for all a ∈ N x, y ∈ N with 1 ≤ x ≤ y. Increasing a does not decrease the right
hand side of (6) and, thus,
c(a+ x)− c(a+ x− 1) ≤ c(b + y)− c(b+ y − 1) (7)
for all a, b ∈ N with a ≤ b and x, y ∈ N with 1 ≤ x ≤ y. As both differences are
nonnegative and x ≤ y, we obtain a valid inequality when multiplying the left
hand side of (7) with x and the right hand side of (7) with y. This implies
c(a+ x)x − c(a+ x− 1)x ≤ c(b+ y)y − c(b+ y − 1)y. (8)
Finally, we have c(a + x − 1) ≤ c(b + y − 1) as c is nondecreasing. Adding this
inequality to (8) gives the claimed result.
To see that there is a strongly semi-convex function that is non convex,
consider the function c : N→ N defined as c(x) = x, if x ≤ 2 and c(x) = x−1/4,
if x ≥ 3. We proceed to show that c is strongly semi-convex. For the following
calculations, for an event E, we write χE for the indicator variable of event E,
i.e., χE = 1, if E is true, and χE = 0, otherwise. We calculate
x
(
c(a+ x)x − c(a+ x− 1)
)
+ c(a+ x− 1)
= x
(
1−
χa+x=3
4
)
+ a+ x− 1−
χa+x≥4
4
.
Thus, c is strongly semi-convex if and only if
x
(
1−
χa+x=3
4
)
+ a+ x−
χa+x≥4
4
≤ y
(
1−
χb+y=3
4
)
+ b+ y −
χb+y≥4
4
for all a, b, x, y ∈ N with a ≤ b and 1 ≤ x ≤ y. Clearly, if a = b and x = y,
this inequality is satisfied trivially, so we may assume that either y ≥ x + 1 or
b ≥ a+ 1. To prove strong semi-convexity, it is sufficient to show
2x+ a+ x ≤ 2y + b− y ·
χb+y=3
4
−
1
4
.
As b ≥ 0, we obtain y ·χb+y=3/4 ≤ 3/4. Using that either y ≥ x+1 or b ≥ a+1,
we obtain the desired result. ⊓⊔
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We analyze the worst-case runtime of Algorithm 1. To this end, let us fix
an iteration of the for-loop. In the proof of Theorem 1, we showed that during
this iteration, for each player, the sorted vector of marginal costs (as defined in
(2)) decreases lexicographically during the while-loop. Moreover, the marginal
cost of a particular unit of demand ij of player i assigned to a resource r does
not depend on the aggregated demand
∑
j∈N xj,r of all players for resource r,
but only on the number of units of demand xi,r assigned to r by player i. We
derive that for each player i and each resource r at most di different marginal
cost values can occur. This observation bounds the number of different marginal
cost vectors of player i by (m · di)di , where m = |R|. Since the marginal cost
vectors lexicographically decrease, the total number of iterations of the while-
loop for each iteration of the for-loop is bounded by
∑
i∈N (m · di)
di . Setting
δ = maxi∈N di, this expression is bounded by (n ·m · δ)δ, where n = |N |. Using
that there are
∑
i∈N di ≤ n · δ iterations of the for-loop, one for each unit of
demand in the game, we obtain the following corollary.
A.3 Proofs of Lemmata A1 and A2 needed to prove Theorem 2
In the proof of Theorem 2, it is claimed that g 6 h, and either F − p + h ∈
F(k) or F − e + h ∈ F(k). This follows as a consequence of the following two
Lemmata.
Lemma A1. Let F ∈ F(k) be of minimal weight w.r.t. the admissible weight
function w, and consider function w¯ as described in Theorem 2. Suppose there
exists F ′ = F − e+ g ∈ F(k) with w¯(F ′) < w¯(F ), and F ′′ = F ′ − p+ h ∈ F(k)
with w¯(F ′′) < w¯(F ′). Then g 6 h.
Proof. If g  h, then w¯(p) > w¯(h) ≥ w(h) ≥ w(g). We consider first the case
where p  e ∈ Kr∗ . Then, by construction of w¯ we have w(e) = w¯(p) > w¯(h) =
w(h) ≥ w(g), implying w(F −e+g) < w(F ) in contradiction to the w-optimality
of F .
Thus, p and e are incomparable. Since w(p) > w(g), the w-optimality of
F implies F − p + g /∈ F(k). But F − p + g is an ideal in P (as p 6 e), so
there must exist some set S ⊆ R with |
⋃
r∈SKr ∩ (F − p+ g)| = f(S) + 1 and
|
⋃
r∈SKr ∩ F | = f(S). It follows that g ∈
⋃
r∈SKr, and p /∈
⋃
r∈SKr.
On the other hand, we know that F − e + g − p + h ∈ F(k), implying that
e ∈
⋃
r∈SKr, and h /∈
⋃
r∈SKr. However, g ∈
⋃
r∈SKr and h /∈
⋃
r∈SKr is a
contradiction to g  h. ⊓⊔
Lemma A2. Suppose that F ∈ F(k), F ′ = F −e+g ∈ F(k), F ′′ = F ′−p+h ∈
F(k), and g 6 h. Then either F − p+ h ∈ F(k) or F − e+ h ∈ F(k).
Proof. Consider first the case where p ≺ e. We know that F−e+h is an ideal in P ,
since g 6 h. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that F−e+h /∈ F(k). Then
there exists some set S ⊆ R with |
⋃
r∈S Kr∩(F−e+h)| = f(S)+1. It follows that
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h ∈
⋃
r∈SKr, and e /∈
⋃
r∈S Kr. Since we assume e and p to lie in the same chain,
it follows that p /∈
⋃
r∈SKr. However, this implies |
⋃
r∈SKr∩(F−e+g−p+h)| ≥
f(S) + 1, in contradiction to F ′′ = F − e+ g − p+ h ∈ F(k).
It follows that p 6 e, so that both, F − p+ h and F − e+ h are ideals in P .
Now we can use the same arguments as above: if neither F −p+h, nor F −e+h
belongs to F(k), there exists a set S ⊆ R with |
⋃
r∈SKr∩(F−p+h)| = f(S)+1
and |
⋃
r∈SKr ∩F | = f(S), implying h ∈
⋃
r∈SKr, and p /∈
⋃
r∈SKr, and there
also exists a set T ⊆ R with |
⋃
r∈T Kr∩ (F −e+h)| = f(T )+1 and |
⋃
r∈SKr ∩
F | = f(T ), implying h ∈
⋃
r∈T Kr, and e /∈
⋃
r∈T Kr. Since |
⋃
r∈SKr ∩ F | =
f(S) and |
⋃
r∈T Kr ∩ F | = f(T ), ich follows by the submodularity of f that
|
⋃
r∈S∪T Kr ∩ F | = f(S ∪ T ). Since
⋃
r∈S∪T Kr ∩ {e, g, p, h} = {p, h, e}, we
have |
⋃
r∈S∪T Kr ∩ (F − e + g − p + h)| ≥ f(S ∪ T ) + 1. A contradiction to
F ′′ = F − e + g − p+ h ∈ F(k). ⊓⊔
17
